Introduction
IN recent years, there has been considerable debate over whether technological change creates unemployment.' Undoubtedly this is a complex issue, involving as it does both macroeconomic and macroeconomic elements. Conceptually, it seems useful to divide the overall impact of technical change upon a particular industry into the following three 'stages': (i) technical change at the firm level and its diffusion through the industry.2 (ii) adaptation of the industry, with entry/exit of firms and changes in market structure. (iii) the general equilibrium impact-where factors transfer to or from alternative uses in response to the own-industry changing patterns of factor and product demand. The focus of this paper is on the first and more particularly the second stages of the above process, associated with relatively long-term industryspecific effects. Naturally, impacts on employment at this stage are of importance when considering the overall extent of unemployment at the third, economy-wide, stage. Although there has been some consideration of macroeconomic effects (Sinclair, 1981 In what follows, we concentrate on capital augmenting technical change. There are two reasons for this; (i) in developed countries with relatively well-fed and well-educated work forces, there is likely to be more scope for improvement in efficiency on the capital side, (ii) at the intuitive level, such innovations are far more likely to be biased against employment creation. On the diffusion process, see e.g. Reinganum (1981), Waterson and Stoneman (1985) . Of course the diffusion process can take some time. 3 One specific "plea for more research" in the Oxford Economic Papers Supplement of November 1983 concerned "the impact of changing industrial structure and technical progress on employment." (p. viii). Very recently, an important contribution, extending from the industry to the macroeconomic level, has been made by Katsoulakos (1986) .
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However, it is straightforward to modify the approach to analyse other versions of neutral technical change. The plan is as follows. Section 2 makes clear an important link between elasticities of factor demand with respect to factor prices and with respect to technical change. Using these relationships, factor demand changes consequent upon a technical change in a competitive and an oligopolistic industry are analysed in Sections 3 and 4, respectively, by examining factor price changes. Influences on the technical change/labour demand relationship are considered in Section 5 whilst Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
Technical change and factor demand elasticities
Since we shall deal principally with the firm's cost function, we first consider in more detail the nature of the capital augmenting technical progress involved, starting from a fairly general formulation. Variable costs (superscript v) are distinguished from long run fixed costs (superscript fi) and it is assumed that capital and labour feature in both but that they may be considered as separate factor inputs (being different varieties of capital and labour): these are (k V , Vf, If) with associated factor prices ( 
where we have suppressed the arguments of F. To economise further on notation, since wf and rf no longer feature explicitly, superscripts v are henceforth omitted and in talking about the demand for labour or capital, we shall mean the demand for lv and kv respectively. Using cost function (4), we wish to develop the effect of a change in 0 on factor (particularly, labour) demands, a task which will occupy much of the rest of the paper. From (4), using Shepard's lemma, the firm's demand for labour is: 
The effect of a capital augmenting technical change on the demand for capital is therefore related to capital's own price elasticity. A technical improvement will increase (decrease) the demand for capital as the own price elasticity is less than (greater than) -1. The relations derived above relate to the firm's demand for factors. These relations however remain unchanged at the industry level. Making the conventional symmetry assumption that the industry comprises n identical firms, the industry demands for labour, L, and capital, K, are given by: In the free entry case, n depends on output and factor prices; n = n(y; rI0, w) but reasoning similar to that used to derive (6) implies that Eno+ Enr = 0 and so 1JLO = llLr (10) holds for both cases. Similarly equation (7) will hold at the industry level:
In what follows, we are primarily interested in the demand for labour (although it is straightforward to extend the analysis to capital). This analysis demonstrates that if technical change augments a factor of production, then simple relationships hold between the elasticity of demand with respect to the technological parameter 0 and factor price elasticities at both firm and industry level.5 Qualitative results for the impact of technical innovation therefore follow immediately from the study of cross-price and own price elasticities of demand for factors.
Factor demands under competition
Pursuing the analogy between capital augmenting technical change and a change in the price of capital, this section treats the effect of factor price changes in an industry composed of price-taking firms, whilst Section 4 builds on this to consider the oligopolistic case. We examine both fixed numbers and zero profit equilibria.
Here, industry output Y is produced by n identical firms and is homogenous. Price is determined by the industry inverse demand function, P = P(Y) whilst, if there is free entry, n is determined by a zero profit condition.
We shall assume homotheticity in g (equation (3)) for simplicity. Therefore the equivalent equation to (4) for firm i is:
Ci = F + c(w, r). h(yi) (12)
where yi is the ith firm's output. If the firm and industry responses to changes in r are established, the impact of technical change is given by the analysis of Section 2 (equations (6)- (11)). F represents fixed costs, as discussed above and c(w, r) is strictly increasing and concave in w, r. We shall further assume (and this is purely to simplify presentation of results) that h is homogenous of degree y, a constant, so that h'y = yh. y is the elasticity of scale and y i 1 denotes decreasing/constant/increasing returns to scale respectively. Of course only the first two of these three cases are possible under the assumptions of price-taking behaviour.
Profits for the ith firm are (henceforth omitting the subscript i)
r = P(Y)y -c(w, r)h(y) -F (13)
Using this framework, the fixed-n and variable-n equations are now examined. 
Factor demands under oligopoly
Again we assume output is homogeneous and produced by n identical firms.6 Profit maximization (compare (14)) is given here by
P(Y)+yP'(Y)X-c(w, r)h'(y)=O (21)
where X = is the conjectural response in total output Y to a change in ay the output of the ith firm. Following Seade (1980), we assume each firm conjectures that other firms follow in full or in part its own change in output,7 thus 1 X A S n. One other difference is that y < 1 is now permissible.
Factor demands are still given by (15). We again consider the two types of equilibrium; fixed-n and free-entry. In the latter case, (13) This completes the task of relating factor demand elasticities following technical change to potentially observable magnitudes. In the next section we develop the implication of these results. In considering the impact of the various parameters on 71Le, we must be careful of certain interdependencies. Thus cr and CVK are not independent; however the sign of iLe depends only on a and so in looking for effects on sign we can treat cr as parametric. Even then, since, from (25), Evaluation is straightforward in principle, but will differ somewhat between cases. It is easiest if we first consider the two "competition" cases, then compare oligopoly with these. Differentiation of the expressions z1 and Z2 in Table I immediately yields the results:
Influences on the elasticities
The first of these extends Allen's (1938, p. 508) basic result. The more elastic is demand (the more negative is /3) the more likely is it that demand for labour will increase consequent upon technical change. This is intuitively sensible since a high demand elasticity implies a large output expansion effect so a lesser likelihood that labour demand might contract when capital is substituted for labour. The result on demand elasticity is also robust to some additional modifications in specification. In particular if demand is of constant elasticity form E = (11/3) -111, so that Z3 = z1. There is a straightforward intuitive explanation since, with constant elasticity of demand, the proportionate price reduction is equal to the proportionate cost reduction (cf. Waterson, 1980 ). The influence of the elasticity of scale upon the derived demand for labour under competition is very much bound up with the size of demand elasticity. Again, some intuitive feel can be injected into this result. An increase in y, by itself, increases the extent of diseconomies of scale, so reduces the optimal scale of the firm; whilst a decrease in r, by itself, reduces diseconomies of scale, so increasing optimal scale (Baumol, Panzar and Willig, 1982, ch. 6). The net effect therefore would appear to depend upon the output effect of the fall in the cost curves (the vertical, as opposed to horizontal impact) and the increase in scale, compared with the y effect of output reduction and a rise in cost curves. For these reasons it depends upon the elasticity of demand. This effect carries through to the constant elasticity of demand oligopoly case.
Before leaving the competition case, we should consider the relative size of short versus long run effects. Examining z1 and z2 from Table I, z1 = z2 if y = 1 but with y > 1, z1 < z2 and hence ?7 1 > ?72. This suggests that, consequent on a technical change, the short run impact on employment is likely to be more beneficial than the long run impact. Thus, suppose initially the industry is at a zero-profit equilibrium and consider the impact of an increase in 0. With fixed-n, industry output will tend to increase by less than 1" If P = aY"1P then P =, -1)aYF2 so E = YP"/P'= 1/3 -1.
in the variable-n case (except if y = 1) and hence one would expect higher labour demand in the long run. On the other hand, however, in the short run, firms operate away from the minimum of their average total cost curve and are affected by diminishing returns to scale: this tends to imply a relatively greater labour demand. The latter effect appears to dominate the former. How does oligopoly differ in terms of consequential labour demand effects from perfect competition? In particular, we must first examine whether demand is more or less elastic under oligopoly. It is evident from inspection of the zi values in Table I In terms of the influence of the parameters /3 and y on the sign of 3rj1/34 in oligopoly cases (i = 3, 4), no general results are available. We have examined three special cases, namely constant demand elasticity, as discussed above, linear demand and parametric E. The results obtained are listed in Table II . As may be seen, these largely parallel the competition results in the case of demand effects, but there is no clear trend (except to say that demand elasticity matters) in the case of the scale parameter. Table  II also Does the model provide insights into real world behaviour? We feel that it does, though we recognise the dangers of casual and selective verification. First, consider the elasticity of substitution. The greater this is, ceteris paribus, the more likely it is that capital augmenting technical change will reduce the demand for labour. Thus, there is a rationale here for workers to try to limit the degree of substitution available by resisting changes in manning levels when new machinery is introduced.14 This however only makes sense for a 'closed' industry-such as newspaper printing-or for the 'siege' economy. If the market is not barred to national or international competition then the indigenous industry is vulnerable, with those firms resisting technical change likely to be the casualties of the first stage adjustment process. Thus we would expect to see more restrictive practices in relatively 'closed' industries such as printing and the docks than in more open markets such as domestic electrical goods and cars.
The difference between open and closed markets may be related more directly to the elasticity of demand impact. An indigenous 'industry' facing international competition is more likely to be facing a more elastic demand for its product. In such a case the elasticity of demand effect is likely to swamp any elasticity of substitution effect-and there is likely to be a more substantial increase in labour demand following technical improvement in this case. This is even more the case if structural effects are consideredsome experiments we have tried in applying numerical values suggest that small-numbers industries with increasing returns to scale and elastic industry demand would have large proportionate increases in labour demand in response to capital augmenting technical progress. This accords well with observations of the development of several industries now in their maturity. Equally it would appear that industries today exhibiting these properties (e.g. home computing products) are expanding employment and that (though individual firms may rise and fall) skilled employees in these areas have little or nothing to fear from such technical change.
It is also important to note that our analysis strongly suggests technological change is not (at least directly) the cause of the rapidly falling employment in U.K. textile industries. The U.K. elasticity of demand for textiles, according to several of Deaton's (1975) estimates, is insignificantly different from -1. Hence from Table I, z1 and z2 (we assume textiles is a fairly competitive industry) are around -1. Consequently it is only if a > 1, which is unlikely, though not out of the realms of possibility (see Nerlove, 1967) , that the elasticity of demand for labour with respect to technical change is negative. The underlying cause is more likely to be foreign competition partly occasioned by failure to adapt to technological change.
Of course there are potential effects apart from those we have detailed in earlier sections. There is, for example, what we characterised in our introductory remarks as the third stage. This is the (explicit or implicit) focus for much of the analysis others have concentrated on. Here, at least two influences emanating directly from those discussed above would seem to be important. First, there is the effect on the capital goods producing industry. Using equations (22a) and (22b), we find that:
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-(a 1) + ?LO (27) Hence, if a = 1 there is the same proportionate effect on capital demand as on labour demand, so if technical change has reduced the demand for labour in the industry in question (e.g. footwear) it is also likely to reduce it in the industry producing equipment for it (the footwear machinery industry). Also, from (25), a low a, while being good for employment in this industry, is less likely to be good for employment in the capital goods industry, and vice versa for high a.
Secondly, a lower effective factor price will imply a lower final good price for this industry.15 This will have both income and substitution effects. As well as the substitution in favour of this good away from others, people who formerly bought the good will have had their real income increased and will therefore spend more on other goods. Increases in such expenditure will be proportionately greater on luxury items and, within a closed economy at least, this would lead to increases in labour demands in those industries. In an open economy, such offsetting effects are less clear-cut, and luxury purchases may come largely from overseas; Thirlwall (1982) suggests this may be a particular worry for the U.K. Extending the analysis to this further stage is naturally rather more speculative and difficult. What we wish to emphasise then, is the diversity of responses that might be expected, since effects in one particular industry can have long-lasting consequences. We have therefore examined the impact of particular forces common to (but having differing effects on) different industrial structures. Predictably important amongst these have been final demand elasticities and the elasticities of substitution, but we believe we have progressed beyond straightforward intuition in noting also the effect of structural influences such as firm numbers and scale factors, and in the distinction between shorter and longer run effects.
University of Newcastle upon Tyne Commodity Research Unit, London University of Newcastle upon Tyne

